The Story of Omar.

OMAR

1 August 1974

Portuguese military base somewhere in the North of Mozambique

While this Blog was set up to celebrate those men and women who may have been forgotten by history I came across this information while researching a certain period of Mozambican history that has all but been forgotten. While this episode may not be Portugal’s Military finest moment, in fact Giancarlo Coccia in his book “The Scorpion Sting” described it as Portugal’s darkest hour militarily, and while the men involved could not be described as Warriors per say, I think that it’s a story that is interesting and worth posting, I hope you agree.

The story of Omar was the culmination of the MFA’s campaign to destroy Portugal’s fighting capabilities in the 3 Colonies of Angola, Guine-Bissau and Mozambique.

While researching Daniel Roxo’s reasons for wanting to leave Mozambique in 1974, I was sent 4 pages from a book called “Fuelling the War  - revealing an oil companies role in the Vietnam war”. Apart from sympathising with the plight of the refugees or the staff of American companies that were so callously left to the mercy of the NVA (many would be jailed or shot out of hand),1 particular passage stood out at me “Since the fall of Ban Mae Thuot and the botched withdrawal of General Phu from Plieku the hopelessness of further resistance had become apparent to the lowest soldier. When the final attack came, even  the elite divisions had rapidly disintegrated, like Napoleon´s Imperial Guard at Waterloo when they realized the overall hopelessness of the position.

There are some similarities regards the “capitulation” of Mozambique to Frelimo by the Communist inspired MFA and the last days of Vietnam with the fall of Saigon to North Vietnamese Forces taking place on 31 April 1975. Probably the biggest  similarity being the conscripts in Mozambique seeing the hopelessness of further resistance and with many not wanting to be fighting in what many considered a foreign country, it’s not surprising.  That moment probably came when they saw Mario Soares embracing Samora Machel on Lusaka on June 5, 1974. The photo was published in every newspaper in Mozambique and what it said to the Portuguese conscript was................................... “The war is over”.

The Portuguese elite Forces such as the Paras, Commandos, Marines, GEP's, Roxo militia and many GE’s, (not all), never disintegrated and until September were ready to fight on. Only Portuguese National Servicemen stopped all fighting from June 20 1974. The GEs after Omar also started to fall apart in many places, especially after Brigadier Melo Egidio (ex-Vila Cabral Governor) told the local GE’s based in Mocimboa da Praia to “Look for Frelimo and make peace with them”.

This instruction from Brigadier Egidio, was the MFA trying to avoid the Portuguese war in Africa. If you look at Scorpion Sting page 92/93 of the English version, General Orlando Barbosa told author Giancarlo Coccia : ........."Things were not so bad and the withdrawal of the troops was proceeding as planned”..........This was on Friday August 9, 1974 but  Giancarlo Coccia did not say that the General told him:"... except for Omar all withdrawal of troops was proceeding as planned". In the new Portuguese version, the full sentence is there. While the GE’s were being encouraged to make peace with Frelimo, at Montepuez the headquarters of the Mozambican Commandos, there Commander Major Freitas gave 3 Commandos born in Mozambique a 5 day jail sentence, their crime was that they had made contact with Frelimo and asked for peace. This is a  good example of a Commander who stood up to the  MFA’s vision of handing over Mozambique to Frelimo.

While the Omar incident occurred on 1 August 1974 we can probably trace the root cause to this unsavoury incident to mid 1973, when Lieut Colonel Pires Veloso, Chief of staff of the Cabo Delgado sector with its Headquarters in Porto Amelia. Veloso asked permission from his Commander, Brigadier Damiao to visit all the units  in their sector, the reason he gave, was to test the morale of the troops. The Brigadier was not happy with this request and told Veloso that all information he collected he would have to report back to him and also present him with a copy of the final report.

Veloso did what his Commander asked, but left out some information and only allowed “selected facts” for the eyes of a limited number of fellow PF members in both Porto Amelia as well as Nampula.

The areas that Veloso visited amongst others where Mueda, Mocimboa do Rovuma, Nazombe, Nangade, Mocimboa da Praia, Palma, Montepuez. At the camps he visited Veloso spoke mainly about the political situation in Portugal , its affect on the   war in Mozambique as well as Angola and Guine – Bissau.  After his return to Porto Amelia, Veloso together with Major Mario Tome  who was General Arriaga’s ADC (to become a big MFA supporter)  who was stationed at Nampula Headquarters drafted and circulated a document  that was to be signed by every Military Academy Officer doing duty in Mozambique, the purpose being that it would be  taken to Lisbon and delivered by hand to members of the future MFA.

On page 15/16 of the Scorpion Sting one reads “As soon as we were installed at our hotel, I telephoned the local Military Chief, Colonel Veloso to thank him for putting a plane at our disposal”. This after Giancarlo and his brother Emelio had been told to leave Nangade by a Colonel Delfim, they then flew to Porto Amelia.

“It was no problem, he said. For you I did it gladly. Would you like to have lunch with me tomorrow. ‘under the circumstances it surprised me that the Colonel was so friendly. He must have been surprised to, for an hour later he phoned to cancel the appointment , with a hint of strain in his voice”  

The cancellation came about due to pressure from fellow MFA aligned officers in Porto Amelia after Veloso had advised them he had invited Giancarlo and his brother to lunch, the brothers were seen  to have the political ideals  that were contrary to the present Portuguese policy. Why people like Veloso joined the MFA, I have no idea I suppose that every person had his own reason/s some like Major Tome believed that Frelimo were the only party that should represent the people of Mozambique while others believed that Frelimo should be part of a election process in Mozambique before independence.

A lesser known fact is that in November 1975 after the chaos of Angola’s independence Major Tome was arrested in Porto under the orders of Veloso, his crime ? Well it would seem that he was Pro MPLA, I know, it makes no sense but perhaps this just shows the circus that the MFA really were.

On June 9 1974, two weeks after the Lisbon coup, Veloso was recalled to Portugal to be appointed as Governor of the Portuguese islands of Sao Tome e Principe in the West coast of Africa. This was reward for the “good work” he had performed in Mozambique and in his memoirs : “Vice-Rei do Norte/ “Vice – King of the North of Portugal” published in 2008 he made the following  comment  (pages 108/109).

“Recordo –me que, em Mocimboa do Rovuma, onde estava a sede de um Batalhao de Cavalria, um Major Juglo que o 2 Commandante, me disse que nao concordava, recusando-se a assinar os documentos. Aceitei perfeitamente a recusa, e nunca mais o abordei sobre o assunto, deixando – o em paz com as suas ideias”/ “I remember that in Mocimboa do Rovuma, at the Headquaters of a Cavalry Battalion, a Major, I think he was the second in Command. Told me that he did not agree with what was in the documents and declined to put his signature to the papers. I accepted his decision and never said anything about the matter to him again. I left him with his ideas”.

So who was this officer that Veloso was writing about. Well at Mocimboa do Rovuma the Cavalry Battlaion based there was under the command of Lieutenant – Colonel Antonio Manuel da Palma Baracho with a Major Carlos Campos as his 2^nd in command. They both arrived in Mozambique shortly after the 1972 Munich  Olympic games to start their 5^th and final tour of duty in Africa. Major Campos was undoubtedly one of Portugal’s finest horse riders and had competed in  the Olympics in the Show jumping discipline.

Having served 3 tours of duty in Guine - Bissau as well as  Angola and having been in Mozambique on a tour of duty prior to arriving for his 2^nd tour in October 1972 , Major Campo was seen a combat experienced and well respected officer, however after the MFA took control of the Portuguese military, honourable and principled men like Major Campos were overlooked for further promotion in the army hierarchy but those that had furthered the MFA’s political agenda were rewarded and Veloso is today a retired General.

The Battalion at Mocimboa do Rovuma had 630 men but like all the other units in Africa after 1972, very few had a core of experienced professional men who had attended Military school in  Lisbon. At the end of Portugal’s wars in Africa they had 230 000 men in the field, however less than 1% of the men serving were permanent force members. In Mozambique from 1972-1974 out of 90 fighting companies the Portuguese only had 5 permanent force (Military Academy) Captains. The rest of the officers, junior officers, corporals were National servicemen on  2 year’s tour of duty.

At Mocimboa do Rovuma  there were only 6 experienced officers, those being Colonel Baracho, Major Campos and 4 professional sergeants, each having a Company to control. Amazingly enough There was not one single experienced soldier that had seen war before arriving in Cabo Delgado. Hard to believe that 4 Sergeants and two Officers could control 624 men, all conscripts from Portugal, with four months of training in Europe posted to the Tanzania Border  that was seen as a 100% warzone and on one of the main routes from their rear bases in Tanzania and to make things more interesting each of the bases were totally isolated from the others. Omar especially was like an island and the only way to re-supply the company based there was by air, Omar also happened to be the closest military base to Tanzania’s border than any other in Cabo Delgado. 

The Battalions 4 Companies were posted to Mocímboa do Rovuma, Nazombe, Negomano with the last one being sent to Omar. Prior to the Omar incident occurring the Commanders of Battalions had received instructions from General Staff HQ in Nampula that they should remove the small outposts like Omar to the HQ of their respective Battalions. Omar was to move to Mocimboa do Rovuma  and the one at Nazombe was to move to Muede, these relocation's were to take place in August.

This “unconditional surrender” of Omar is an interesting story that has only recently seen the light of day with the publishing of the updated Portuguese version of “Scorpion Sting, first published in 1976. Omar was for all intensive purposes the end of the war for the Portuguese. History books tell us that the official end of the war between Portugal and Frelimo was 00:00 hours September 8 1974, signed in Lusaka – Zambia. The MFA however had declared an “unofficial” end of the war for 31 July 1974, a radio signal from Nampula sent by the MFA on the normal Military channels was “All troops must make their own peace accords with Frelimo at local level”.  

Omar as mentioned was manned by a company of 147 men from the Battalion based at  Mocimbao do Rovuma as well as a detachment of 31 men  from Namgade, who were manning artillery pieces on loan from South Africa. Frelimo on the other hand had over 250 armed men and about 900 members of the local population with them.

Omar was Company 1 C/Cav. 8421/73 under the command of Captain Miliciano “graduado”, this means that he was a conscript Lieutenant that had rank of temporary Captain. He was not at Omar at the time of the incident as he was on sick leave and had been replaced by a 22 year old conscript Jose Carlos Monteiro. Jose had been trained in Boane near to LM and had no combat experience whatsoever. This many, myself included believe was a deliberate ploy by the MFA to destroy the machine that had been fighting the war since 1961.

Not only that, we tend to forget that Portugal was a member of NATO an organization that had been established to counter the threat of Communism, the very people the MFA were intending to hand the colonies over too via the PAIGC, MPLA and Frelimo . Of the 162 men taken prisoner only 157 arrived in Tanzania due to 5 men managing to escape and make their way back to Namgade on August 3, 4 and 5. Interestingly enough none of these men who risked their lives to escape were ever decorated for their bravery, the MFA would not allow it, probably because they did not like the fact that those 5 men had done their duty against the MFA’s new friends, Frelimo. “Shameful indeed”.

I was sent a newspaper clipping from 2004 in which Lieutenant Monteiro was interviewed, strangely enough the only one ever regards this embarrassing day in Portuguese military history and  was asked  if he would have done the same thing again, if he was in the same circumstances? His answer was  an unequivocal “yes”.

On 22 July 1974 the MFA had a meeting in Nampula and afterwards sent a long message to MFA-Lisbon saying the following “If you don’t organize and immediate ceasefire with Frelimo by July 31, we MFA-Mozambique will initiate one on the ground”, which they did by means of a radio broadcast as mentioned earlier.

After Omar, which was a staged surrender and many believe a stunt to demoralize  any men in the field who may still have had some fighting spirit left, the MFA issued a general order that all smaller bases had to be closed and the men withdrawn to their Battalion Headquarters. This withdrawal was to start on August 1^st and be completed by August 20. This order was obviously to remove any barriers that may have caused Frelimo any inconvenience.

Daniel was requested by Army Headquarters in Nampula to assist in removing those Portuguese companies  in the far north of Niassa to Vila Cabral. So Daniel and his men probably totalling no more than 90 - 100 at the time being asked to protect well armed regular Portuguese conscripts  is actually  laughable, but the MFA may have had another motive for asking Daniel to do so. Having been a thorn in the side of Frelimo since 1964, Daniel who had a large reward “dead or alive “ on his head would have been a sitting duck for Frelimo to kill or capture.

Daniel probably realized that this request was a trap and an easy way for he and his men to get killed. Daniel and his men where phantoms, shadows, Frelimo never knew were they would come from or where they would go and now they would all be together in 1 area, the dates and times of the withdrawal would be broadcast to all and sundry by both bush telegraph as well as “official channels” Daniel had not survived 10 years of fighting against Frelimo to be handed to

them on a silver platter, he was cleverer than that, Daniel  respectfully declined the request.  

  

Interestingly enough a high ranking SADF General who had paid a courtesy visit to Mozambique in mid July 1974 and had been given a tour of certain facilities understood that the Portuguese Armed Forces under the control of the MFA in Nampula, had  all but given up the war.  He was of the opinion that It was a matter of days, not months, that the war would stop from the Portuguese side. Omar had received radio instructions from headquarters to make local peace accord with Frelimo. The Commandos would never have surrendered to Frelimo. But these “civilians in uniform” did not even make a plan to defend the camp. It’s obvious to me that Frelimo had prior information about the state of mind of these as well as other conscript soldiers from Portugal who believed that “this was not there war or their land to defend”.

It’s also generally assumed that a follow up operation was conducted after the capitulation of Omar to rescue  the men that had been taken prisoner by Frelimo and were being marched to Tanzania to be put on display, this never happened because a message from Lisbon to military headquarters read “Men in good hands, safe under Frelimo control” , further proof that the MFA dominated Portuguese forces had decided to hand Mozambique over to Frelimo on a silver platter. The order to bomb Omar with Nalpalm was only given by General Diego Neto days after the Portuguese soldiers had arrived in Nashingwea (Tanzania) Military base.

Another interesting piece of information that I came across was that a journalist that worked for the Observer of London who also happened to be a pro- Frelimo sympathiser reported about the incident at Omar the very same day it happened, indicating to me that  he was in the know about  the MFA/Frelimo’s plans. 

Stephen Dunkley

31/3/2013

"The photos of bases and Portuguese soldiers used for this Blog where sourced from the Internet".