.JPG)
After posting the 2nd
Blog on Portuguese refugees I got a comment from a member of the face book page
that stated………………. “Ok read. One comment though, it is still not shocking
enough to show what the true situation was. Also Savimbi used to say in
Portuguese that we should stay and in African language, “kill the white man”.
This was testified by several whites who were fluent in that dialect”. I did
receive some pictures from that period that had been published in a book
sometime after most of the Portuguese had left Angola……………….. And while “not
nice” I will post a few in that Blog to show the “real picture” over that period.
.jpg) |
| Dead bodies collected in Luanda 1975 |
While part 2 of this
particular story was about the refugees that fled from Angola, this Blog will
concentrate on those Portuguese men, women and children that had to or decided
to leave Mozambique after the signing of the Lusaka accord that handed over
Mozambique to Frelimo on a plate and led to the unsuccessful LM coup of 6 -10
September 1974, as well as the incident in October that same year, that saw the
indiscriminate killing of both black and white Mozambicans by Frelimo supporters.
Prior to
the September coup it is estimated that 220 000 to 250 000 whites resided
in Mozambique, however by 1977 these numbers had reduced to approximately 10 000
- 15 000. Soon after the transitional government came to power (20
September 1974) with a cabinet comprising of 3 Portuguese and 7 Frelimo
representatives, that included the post of Prime Minister, wheels where set in
motion to create a Stalinist one – party society with an official policy of
“Democratic Centralism” all opposition parties where banned, opponents of the
Government were banned with many being jailed in camps that were set up for this
purpose, Frelimo called them re-education camps, but in reality they were more
like Concentration camps.
Even local
Portuguese soldiers were not spared with a number being handed over to Frelimo
by the Portuguese. “Enemies” of the state were put on public display and many
never seen again after entering the camps, Frelimo refused to supply details to
Amnesty International about person incarcerated and it was only in 1983 with
the defection of the then SNASP chief Jorge da Costa who brought with him proof
that Frelimo ordered the executions of prominent leaders of the opposition,
this was achieved by execution, starvation or beatings, people such as Uria Simango,
Father Mateus Gwenjere and Lazaro Nkavandame where killed this way.
After 10
September photographs that had been taken in LM at the time of the spontaneous uprising
(that many “I believe” incorrectly call a coup) where used to identify
ringleaders and possible members of the Portuguese military that had assisted
in any way. A headline in a South African paper confirms this “Reprisal Fears
are rife among refugees” - “Fear of Frelimo reprisals among the
thousands of Mozambique fugitives in South Africa is now so strong that tough
measures are being taken by Portuguese patrols on the border to prevent press
coverage that might identify families”.
The main
help to Frelimo at this time was a Captain (today a General) called Camilio. He
arrested anti Frelimo Portuguese officers and handed them over to his new
masters. One GEP Non-commissioned officer, a Captain Luis Fernandes was arrested
on 18 October at the Polana Hotel by two Portuguese Captains and 15 MP’s on the
orders of Camilo. He was transported by plane to Mueda with other military personnel
that had been arrested by them and passed on to Frelimo. These men were then
handed over to Frelimo and paraded in front of the Population tribunal in
Mueda, Cabo Delgado. Captain Luis Fernandes was eventually released in 1976.
Another Commando Sergeant was still being held by Frelimo in 1980 with many ex
members of the GE, GEP’s and Commando’s never being heard of or seen again
after they fell into Frelimo’s hands.
While many
ex – Black Portuguese servicemen did suffer at the hand of the countries new
masters a good number of ex-soldiers either “vanished” into the bush or managed
to get out of Mozambique and join the Rhodesian armed forces. There were also
ex-soldiers that were transported from Nacala, in the North of Mozambique by
boat to Lisbon in soon after September of 1974.
These men
did not have official permission from the MFA to have travelled to Lisbon or to
actually reside In Portugal as the MFA felt they were not Portuguese. But the
soldiers felt that because they had defended Portugal’s interests in Mozambique
and that Mozambique was a Portuguese possession they were in fact Portuguese.
They had to battle for a number of years to get Portuguese documents and to
eventually get their families from Mozambique over to Portugal. The MFA passed
a law to say that if you wanted Portuguese citizenship that you had to prove
one of your parents was in fact born in Portugal. Frelimo on the other hand
stated that all black people born in Mozambique were de facto Mozambicans, any
other race who wanted to stay in Mozambique after independence (25 June 1975)
had to request to become Mozambicans or get out of the country.
All
Portuguese farmers, shop keepers and business owners had to decide whether to
request becoming Mozambicans or get out of the country that they considered
home. Many decided to leave before independence and all their houses,
businesses or properties were nationalized. I was always .under the impression
that those that left had sabotaged their factories their homes and farms so
that Frelimo could not benefit from their hard work and while it did happen it
was not on as large a scale as I believed. What is a fact however is that many properties and businesses were allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that they would need a total re-build.
.jpg)
Cases such
as the following also occurred after Frelimo took control of Mozambique. Many
people who had been born in Mozambique and who had servants would house and
feed them; they even schooled their children as well as clothed them had those
very servants come to the house after independence and told them to leave as
“everything was now theirs”
Just to
make it even harder on those who had decided to leave, as from January 1st
1975 some 6 months before “official” independence no one was allowed to legally
take money out of Mozambique and this still with the Portuguese flag flying. The
exception was if you had worked for the Portuguese Government in Mozambique,
had a Portuguese passport as well as a visa for South Africa, Rhodesia, Brazil,
etc. 90% of all civil administration had to go to Portugal by the end of 1976
and this meant that from 1974 – 1977 the number of civil servants in Portugal
nearly doubled from 350 000 to over 670 000 with many receiving their
pay every month but having no jobs to go to and today each and every one of
them receives a government pension.
The lucky
ones who were able to sell their assets and transfer the money out of
Mozambique before they left, started leaving Mozambique from mid-1973 (about
2000 every month until January 1975) So what made these Mozambicans decide to
pack up after May 1973 and look for greener pastures, when the general public
and the world at large were under the impression that the Portuguese Military
had the war under control? Well the short version is this. The Portuguese
Socialist party was revitalized in Germany after a meeting between two very
important Soviet officials as well as Mario Soares and Alvaro Cunhal in Paris
early 1973. The Russians promised support and money in exchange that the
government of Caetano be overthrown and wheels set in motion to hand over
Angola to the MPLA, Guinea Bissau to the PIAGC and Mozambique to Frelimo.
This
information was passed on to General Arriaga at the time by a foreign Secret
Service, many high ranking persons from military and political circles became card
carrying members of the Socialist party and they in turn infiltrated into all
levels of society in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau telling those that
would listen that if they wanted to work and live in Mozambique in the future,
they should join Frelimo who would take over power. This takeover was earmarked
after the completion of the Cahora Bassa dam, sometime mid-1975. At this stage
rumours were also doing the rounds that Portugal would negotiate with Frelimo
for a settlement in Mozambique via Jorge Jardim.
Those
Mozambicans who could see the “whole picture” decided it would be impossible
after Frelimo took control of the country for whites to have any power to
negotiate a good deal and they decided to sell everything and start afresh in
another country. And as we know the
final result after the MFA negotiations saw the uprising in LM and to a smaller
extent in Beira and later the massacres of innocents in October.
You could
stay in Mozambique without requesting Mozambican nationality if you got
“Cooperantes” status, what this meant is that if you got an official contract
with the new government of Mozambique, Namely Frelimo they would allow you to
stay in Mozambique for as long as it took for you to train a replacement who
was obviously a Mozambican born supporter of Frelimo. One this had been
achieved you had to leave the country of your birth. This arrangement did not
last long as all had left by early 1977. Frelimo replaced these white Mozambicans
with people from Communist countries.
A friend
of mine had a sister who decided to accept the offer to become a Mozambican and
stay to assist teaching Mozambicans. Her salary was cut from June of 1975 to
2 500 escudos and she was forbidden to travel outside of Mozambique and
when she had had enough, a plan had to be made to get her out safely via South
Africa. The vast majority however did not take up the offer to become Mozambican.
A good number of South Africans did apply for and received Mozambican passports
after 1975, for Frelimo they became Mozambicans of “convenience”. For Frelimo it did not matter if you had ever
lived in Mozambique.
.jpg)
The Lusaka
accord was signed on 7 September 1974 at the State house in Lusaka and for a
number of years I had wondered why, well it would seem that the then President
of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda was a little put out that President Julius Nyerere of
Tanzania, the MFA and Frelimo had worked out a plan to hand Mozambique over to
Frelimo without his involvement. This was a way of appeasing Kaunda. All the
details of the handover of Mozambique had in fact already been agreed upon by
the MFA and Frelimo in Dar –es- Salam on 1 and 2 August 1974.
I have not
been able to find in any book about this period and written in English the fact
that the MFA had met with Frelimo 4 times in 1974 as many, myself included are
or were under the impression that the MFA and Frelimo had only met twice prior
to the signing.
The first
of the meetings took place on 5 July in Lusaka but nothing of consequence came
from this meeting and Frelimo intensified its attacks on civilians, mainly the
black population. A second meeting in Tanzania took place over period 30 July to 2 August and
at this meeting the MFA much to Frelimo’s surprise capitulated, this decision
was probably linked to the “Omar incident” on August 1 1974.(See Born Warriors Blog; “The story of Omar”,
posted 31/3/2013)
The 3rd
and perhaps the most significant meeting took place in Dar- es- Salam on 15 and
16 August were pressure was put on General Spinola by using the Omar incident;
it was at this meeting that the Lusaka accord was drafted and subsequently presented
to General Spinola in Lisbon as a fait - acompli. The 4th meeting in
Lusaka was merely to put signatures on a piece of
paper (signed 7 September) where the conditions that had already been agreed on
were rubber stamped as well as to involve Kenneth Kaunda so he did not feel
side-lined.
And why
you may ask was it important that Kaunda not be side-lined and that the
agreement be signed in Lusaka, Zambia. Well as much as Vorster was looking to
become the “white” voice of reason in Southern Africa, Kaunda was seen as a
vital role player in ensuring peace in the region. While Dar-es-Salam was seen
as the “war capital” and the epicenter of the fight against white colonists,
many wanted to see Lusaka become the “peace capital” of the region.
.jpg) |
| L to R Machel, Nyerere and Kaunda |
The first
Frelimo cadres arrived in LM on 13 September 6 days after the signing of the
Lusaka agreement and immediately starting joint patrols and manned roadblocks with
the Portuguese army, as per the Lusaka accord. These cadres were actually
Tanzanian soldiers as Frelimo did not have enough suitable men to fulfill that
duty until a little later. Those initial Tanzanian troops stayed in Mozambique
for a few months after their arrival (probably as an insurance policy for
Frelimo just in case there was a problem with the implementation of the Lusaka
agreement). Some of these Tanzanian soldiers actually decided to stay in
Mozambique.
The men on
the street were seasoned fighters and had been specifically chosen to protect
the interest of Frelimo and Mozambique. To those white residents of LM who had
decided to stay and see what would happen this was a new LM one filled with
uncertainty and fear? Most of Frelimo’s leaders were Maoist in their outlook
and the words “Let the revolution be total – let it permeate every level of
society” was not just a catch phrase it was what they aimed to achieve and it
started almost immediately.
One of the
first courses of action initiated by Frelimo was a complete overhaul of the
established Portuguese education system with all education being orientated on
party based lines with re-education being a high priority with Frelimo making
no secret that re-education went hand in hand with Frelimo’s policy of National
Socialism. Private ownership would not be allowed and workplace forums would be
set up to ensure that Frelimo’s policies were implemented in the workplace
Traditional
tribal rights were banned, such as the buying of wives, polygamy and no one
would be allowed to marry before they had turned 18 years old. The liberation
of women with regards the franchise, same work same pay were also high on
Frelimo’s agenda. Frelimo also abolished the Escudo so a new currency, the
Meticas could be implemented) as well as moving away from Portuguese as the
main language, it was mooted that Swahili would be the second language of the
new Mozambique. As was expected “In the interests of Mozambique” no opposition
parties would be tolerated as Prime Minister Joaquim Chissano stated “We
believe that Frelimo will provide all the political requirements of the new
society”
Around 15
September the Portuguese army started to move out of its headquarters and on 20
September the transitional government as already mentioned had moved into LM. The
Interim Frelimo/Portuguese government immediately gave the White population 90
days to decide whether or not to accept Mozambican citizenship or leave, it was
called Lei da Nacionalidade Mocambicana/ New Mozambican law of 1975. 1 in 3
apartments in white areas immediately went up for sale or to rent and numerous farms
abandoned. Those who left were allowed 1 suitcase and 150 dollars in Escudos.
As can be expected the manufacturing and farming sectors suffered badly during
this exodus and to be honest never recovered.
By
mid-November new laws that that the transitional government had made started to
take effect. These new laws were made with the assistance young pro-communist
lawyers that had joined the MFA in LM.
·
No
more free transfer of money to Portugal was allowed, not even for sons or
daughters studying at University in Lisbon and other institution’s in Portugal.
·
No
more promotions in the civil service for any person/s that would have been
promoted to a higher post before the end of 1974.
However
perhaps the one person that was the main reason many Mozambicans left
Mozambique was the Minister of the Interior of the transitional government –
Armando Emilio Geubuza, he made an executive order, better known as code 24-20.
The order was that any person who had a Portuguese passport had 24 hours to get
out of the country and they could take with them 20kgs of luggage and no money.
Armando
Guebuza is today the President of Mozambique, having from 1966 been Frelimo’s
main political Commissar who had been very friendly with Joe Slovo and company
of the ANC. His plan was to rid Mozambique of all the well-educated so he could
bring in East Europeans as well as Cubans to infiltrate every walk of life. For
example, the new professor at the faculty of medicine at the University of LM
was from Bulgaria, but he needed the lessons to be given by a Portuguese person
because students could not understand him.
Many
Portuguese people I have had the great fortune to correspond with during my
research, especially those from Mozambique all had one thing in common, their
praise for the South African people’s assistance and generosity in there hour
of need will never be forgotten, this is probably also the reason why so many
Portuguese men and women were willing to fight for South Africa and in many
cases pay the ultimate price for their adopted country. It would seem the
majority of Mozambicans fled via the Border post of Komatipoort some 130 km’s
from the town of Nelspruit, some got out via Ponta D Oura and made their way to
Durban, while many also got out of LM by boat that took them to Durban. Other points
of departure would have been Via Ressano Garcia/Komatipoort, Ponta d’Oura into
South Africa, Namaacha/lomahahsha – Goba/Mhlumeni into Swaziland and Malvernia
– Machipanda/Mutare (Umtali) as well as across the border in Tete into Rhodesia.
South
African police in particular turned a blind eye to those entering the Republic “illegally”
and while no “official” figures were available at the time it was “guestimated”
that the numbers ran into thousands. To South Africa’s credit not one person
was turned away from the border in their time of need.
A serious problem
the refugees did encounter when crossing the border was changing Escudos into
Rands with many banks simply refusing to facilitate the exchange process. “I
can’t even buy myself a packet of cigarettes” one young lady said in Durban
where refugees arrived by sea form the second day running.
Not one
bank in Durban was prepared to exchange Escudos as bank managers saw this as a
Department of Community Development problem as it was a welfare and not a
banking problem. A local Thomas Cook travel agency assisted the refugees but at
a much lower rate than the official exchanges rate, the official rate being 37
to the Rand with 150 to one being offered.
Another
problem that no one had anticipated was how to house those husbands and wives
who had married across the colour line and while totally acceptable in
Mozambique was frowned upon by both the Government as well as general society
in 1974.
Some
headlines of the time that were printed in the Eastern Province Herald were
·
Mozambique tense (September 9)
·
Frelimo mobs stone Army and Police
(September 10)
·
Many dead , hundreds hurt in LM riot
(September 12)
·
Government aid to those fleeing to SA
(September 12)
·
Ships head for Durban and PE
(September 12)
·
White dissidents end Frelimo Protests
(September 12)
·
Refugees have terrible tales
(September 12)
·
Reprisal fears rife among refugees
(September 14)
·
Frelimo big 6 will reach LM today
(September 14)
·
LM people wild with despair (September
17)
To give
you some sort of an idea what was being reported I will reproduce part of one
of the stories
“Lourenco Marques – More than 40
people were killed and hundreds injured in all night riots in the Mozambique
capital that spread by early morning from the shanty towns into the fringes of
the city………………..”
I was of
the opinion that the majority of Mozambicans who had left after the September
coup, never returned to Mozambique. I was however wrong. It would seem that
many Mozambicans would have liked to stay in Mozambique, even after the “Coup
attempt” that many saw as stupidity from revolutionaries that could not achieve
anything. Why do I say that? Well that very same weekend the civilian
population spontaneously took over the Radio Club as well as a few other key
points, the Portuguese were already flying in Frelimo’s minister of Defence
Joaquim Chissano as well as other Frelimo leaders into Nampula to hold meetings
with General de Lima and Colonel Menezes to arrange the take-over of strategic
military bases.
Mozambique
was already lost and even a “planned” coup that had been scheduled for 20 September
would not have achieved the independence that some Mozambicans wanted. At best
it would have divided the country up into a Communist North and an anti-communist
South, with the possibility of South Africa and Rhodesia being drawn into a
conventional war and with the Americans looking to pull out of Vietnam there
was a slender chance, if any that they would have become involved in another regional
conflict against Communist backed forces. The South Africans where fully informed
as to the happenings at the Lusaka meeting and at that stage Vorster was aggressively
pursuing his policy of detente with African nations and would not have got
involved in a war to save Mozambique that South African Generals estimated
would need 30 - 40 000 troops, they also knew that South West Africa was
the key to South Africa’s future. This makes sense as I have also heard the
theory that Vorster and the South African Cabinet had looked into the future
and had decided that the threat to South Africa was in fact from the North as
Mozambique was more dependent on South Africa as well as Rhodesia at that stage
for their economic prosperity, so perhaps it was felt that Mozambique could be
controlled economically and Angola if needs be militarily.
Something
that people may forget or where not aware of is that South Africa came close to
running out of strategic reserves during operation Savannah and the period
thereafter so it’s possible that this scenario was sitting at the back of their
minds. What would have happened if Mozambique was antagonistic towards SA with
Cuban Russian or even Chinese backing had decided to attack SA via Mpumalanga
or even Northern Natal?
A good
number of people who had left Mozambique for safety reasons soon after the
September coup came back after a few weeks looking to become part of a “new”
Mozambique and willing to contribute to its future. Only people that had taken
part in the LM coup or had been identified by the Frelimo dominated interim
government as “enemies of the state” decided to stay in either South Africa or
Rhodesia, some for good or as a stepping stone back to Portugal or other
countries of choice. Daniels Brother Alipio spent 3 months in Machava jail as a ploy by Frelimo to get Daniel to surrender
himself as they knew he had played a large part in the LM uprising, what they
did not know at the time is that Daniel was already in South Africa and taking
his first steps to fight another enemy as well as becoming a legend in the
South African Defence Force.
So who
left after the Lusaka accord and the subsequent moments that changed the
history of not just Mozambique but possible Southern Africa and where did they
go to? I cannot guarantee that these figures are 100% accurate but I do believe
that they are reasonably close. It would seem that between June 1974 and July
1975 18 000 – 20 000 Mozambicans had been accepted by South Africa, this shows
me that a good number of Mozambicans had already seen the writing on the wall and
had decided to leave. From 1973 – 1977, 150 000 Mozambicans (including
Daniel Roxos wife and children) left for Portugal and probably 10 000 left
Mozambique via Rhodesia, but this does not mean that they all stayed in that
country.
Its
estimated half moved to South Africa to make a better life for themselves. TAP
(Portuguese airlines) for years had weekly flights, Lisbon to Johannesburg, via
Salisbury, back to Lisbon. In comparison between 5 000 and 8 000
Angolans decided to stay in South Africa with even a few brave souls deciding
that Zaire would be preferable to South Africa, Portugal or Brazil. A good
number of refugees from both Angola as well as Mozambique chose Brazil as their
destination of choice.
As already
mentioned those who stayed behind after so many had been forced to leave
probably wanted to give Frelimo and the “new Mozambique” a chance. While a number of whites as well as black Mozambicans
had been killed during the attempted coup life was not as bad as had been expected.
In October 1974 an incident was to occur that would see the majority of White
Mozambicans leaving the country, but not before many innocent people (black and
white) were murdered.
 |
| mass graves for those killed in October massacres |
On October 2, five off duty Commando’s
from the 4 Group of the Commando Company 2043 were in the centre of LM near the
famous corner of the Continental Café, Scala Café and Cinema, John Orr ladies
and gents shop, LM post office and the Predio nauticos insurance company. It
was around 5.20pm and one of the Commando’s was having his boots polished by a
young man who was wearing a Frelimo T shirt. When he had finished the shoe
shine boy asked the Commando for 5 escudos payment (about 10 cents), as the Commando
was about to pay him, a gent sitting at a table at one of the Café’sadjacent to
the shoe shine stand said “don’t pay the normal price is 3 escudo’s”. At this
point another client pointed out that he was wearing a Frelimo shirt and was
only charging them more because they were Portuguese soldiers. An argument
between the shoe polisher then ensued and the Commandos got very upset.
Eventually the shoe shine boy left without being paid, the Commando’s then had
a cup of coffee and as they had just finished and were paying their bill a
Frelimo patrol approached with the shoe shine boy goading them on.
The Frelimo patrol consisted of 10
heavily armed men carrying AK47’s and a LPG rocket launcher. They arrested the
Commando Diamantino and one of his colleagues went to his aid. One report say
the Frelimo patrol only wanted the Commando to pay the 5 escudo’s to the shoe
shine boy while others say they wanted to arrest the Commando and his friend.
Why this particular patrol was made up of Frelimo membr only is not known, as
it was the norm, since after the attempted coup of 6-10 September all army
patrols had to be made up of Portuguese and Frelimo soldiers.
The Commando’s (probably Diamantino
and the other Commando being arrested) then grabbed 2 AK’s and ran 50 meters
before taking cover behind cars parked in front of John Orr’s. shots were fired
at the patrol killing 3 Frelimo cadre’s. The Commando’s never stopped running
from the scene using cars stationed in the middle of Avenue da Republica as
cover to get to the next traffic light, situated near the hotel Turismo and the
SA offices.
The 2 Commandos managed to get a lift
from a young Portuguese man that had stopped at the traffic light. By 5.45pm more Frelimo soldiers arrived at the
scene and soon after 30 Commando’s arrived on trucks and fully armed to assist
their comrades. They attacked the Frelimo soldiers that saw another 7 of the
Frelimo soldiers killed and one Commando wounded. During the fire fight total
pandemonium ensued with pedestrians running for their lives and cars crashing
into each other.
At approximately 7pm that evening the
Commando’s made their way back to the camp. At 7.30 pm MFA representatives from
LM arrived at the camp and the Commando’s had to agree that they would leave LM
but they first wanted to go to Nampula before they went to Beira as the MFA had
insisted they do.
The Commandos
believed and correctly so that if they were sent to Beira they would have been
disarmed and flown back to Lisbon, the reason for wanting to go to Nampula was
so they could get themselves organised. The
Commandos arrived in Nampula just before midnight on 2 specially chartered
Boeing 737’s that parked as far away from the terminals as possible, the men
arrived in Nampula fully armed and looking decidedly unhappy, they were met by
comrades from Montapuez who had had been advised of what had happened in
LM.
The two Commando
companies minus a man who wanted to stay in Mozambique as well as 17-18 others
who wanted to stay in Montapuez were taken by Jaime Neves who had flown in from
Portugal to Angola, the civilian population in LM however were not as lucky. As
darkness fell on LM, Frelimo assisted by black supporters started the killings
that have become known as the October massacre. From 21-28 October it’s
estimated that more than 2000 whites, especially children and old people were
killed, many cut to pieces, one can only imagine the horror of LM residents
during this period. At first the attacks seemed to be uncoordinated and a means
to “let off steam” but by the next day the attacks became organized.
Many
whites would probably have liked to stay on in Mozambique under a Frelimo
government but when they realized that Frelimo was being controlled by hardened
Communists and the attacks after the October incident made them realize that
they were not welcome and contributed in ensuring that many would join the
exodus out of Mozambique. A large number
of Mozambicans who had left after the attempted coup of September
While the
fire fight and killing of 9 Frelimo may have been seen by the Commando’s as a
“victory” it was in fact an empty victory with a devastating cost, not only in
the lives of the innocents that it claimed but it would also affect the history
of Mozambique itself as any white Mozambican who may have considered staying
decided that this possibility was in fact realistic. To some it was stupidity
because the outcome of the fire fight would make no difference, Mozambique was
lost and this act of defiance would do nothing to change that fact.
A source
that has helped me with information in this Blog has a sister who was a nursing
sister in the LM hospital called "Hospital Miguel Bombarda". The side entrance of the hospital as well as the courtyard of the laboratories were used to hold the bodies due to the fact that the morgues were overflowing from the butchery of the 21 and 22 October. She was
shocked at what she saw, so many people needlessly killed. Joaquim Chissano who was the Prime Minister of Mozambique at the time also paid
the hospital a visit and is said to have been very shocked at what he saw, its
reputed he said “This is not what I wanted this is not why we where at war for 10 years” and wept for those men women and children that had been
murdered.
After the
Commandos that had been involved in the initial incident arrived in Montepuez
they refused to hand over their personal weapons or equipment as by this time
they trusted no one and they were correct in doing so, on October 22 Dr Joana
Simiao was arrested by Portuguese troops under the command of the new
Mozambican government. The Lusaka accord
of September 7 had made provision that the control of Portuguese forces was in
the hands of the High Commissioner (Admiral Victor Crespo) who had taken office
on 11 September 1974. As the High Commissioner he was the Portuguese
representative in Mozambique and as such the Commander in Chief of all
Portuguese forces in that country. Article 4 of the accord also made provision
for the High Commissioner to be in charge of internal security until
independence. A particular officer that was on Crespo’s staff was a card
carrying member of the Portuguese Communist party and one of the many pro -
Frelimo officers that had been posted to Mozambique after September 7.
This
particular officer only received orders from the ex-Portuguese pilot and now
Frelimo member Jacinto Veloso, this particular officer was also suspected of
being in the employ of the KGB and responsible for the arrest of many a
Mozambican civilians as well as ex-military men, who were summarily handed over
to Frelimo, many never to be seen again. Captain Jaime Neves took the 2
Commando companies to Angola about a week after the incident many have said
that only Captain Neves could have persuaded the 320 men to leave Mozambique,
if they had not it’s hard to say what could have happened but I am of the
opinion that if those 320 battle hardened men had decided to stay, many more
lives would have been lost unnecessarily.
Niassa
Intervention Militia’s Daniel Roxo’s own brother Alipio who had been in
Mozambique since the late 40’s was
arrested by Frelimo and held at Machava jail for 3 months from December 12 19
74 to March 11 1975 a letter was sent to a contact of Daniel. Alipio left
Mozambique soon thereafter and started a new life in Portugal with a large
family and nearly no money. Alipio had owned 5 flats that where taken by the
Frelimo government without any compensation he also lost his position as chief
of a department at the Mozambique railways. Alipio was assisted by a family
friend to get released from jail after he had found out that Alipio had been
arrested. Soon after Alipio was released from jail he asked to go on pension
from the railways, got his affairs in order and made arrangements to move to
Portugal.
Recently I
came across information that I had either received from Mozambicans who left
Mozambique soon after that failed September uprising.
“The question of the Portuguese troops
not lifting a finger to help either those attempting to take over the country
or the citizens afterwards is true. There excuse was that they had to treat the
same, but we have later realised that they were helping bring the Frelimo armed
men during the night from Lusaka to Maputo. And yes there were a lot of
atrocities
“When I came to South Africa I carried
a suitcase and I had R50 in my pocket, which I had managed to exchange in
Lourenco Marques. It was difficult as there was a lot of disappointment and
resentment towards against the Portuguese government. There was a lot of
sympathy from South Africans.
Yes there were a lot of atrocities
from both sides, whites against the blacks, but the whites that took the brunt,
were the ones (poor) that lived on the Maputo outskirts and were caught by the
mobs. The guy with whom I came to with a day before from a road Construction
Company was hacked to death with his wife in front of his children while trying
to flee to a safer place, his 2 sons survived with panga cuts to the head.
After
we realized the coup was doomed, I personally laid low for a few days,
took a flight to Tete to get a permit from the army to be able to leave the
country as I had made a decision to go to South Africa. I remember being very
wary of what was happening at the airport, in case of them screening people,
but being an internal flight it was not treated as an international one.
There were some restrictions of movement
in town but I am not sure there was a formal martial law declaration. I know
that the banks were allowing only very small withdrawals. I had told my wife to
withdraw all the money she could and to exchange it to Rands. We decided that I
should go to SA first and that my wife would stay behind and pack up the house.
It was not an easy decision but one that we felt was the safest at that time.
On 18 September I left in my land
Rover with a suitcase and R50 that I hid and I followed at the back of a
protected convoy to Ressano Garcia. Everybody was supposed to register for the
convoy, which I did not do and when queried by some Portuguese soldiers, I
pleaded ignorance of that requirement. We were stopped at Boane, were
Portuguese and Frelimo soldiers (the first time I saw them) checked my suitcase
as well as cubbyhole in the land Rover.
I crossed the border at Komatipoort
legally on a tourist visa with R50 and a suitcase and as I have already
mentioned I did not register with the convoy that I followed just in case they
arrested me due to my involvement over 7-10 September. I basically followed the
convoy keeping a safe distance.
When I
asked the following question, “When you came to South Africa did you have
contacts here that you could go to (friends/family)?
“I knew a couple of people in South
Africa and I stayed with them for a week before finding a place to stay. Having
a technical background (land surveyor) I found a job on the second day in South
Africa with a construction company, this allowed me to sustain myself, but the
first month was very difficult and not a happy time, due to the family being in
Mozambique over a very uneasy time”.
“I contemplated going back to
Mozambique to be with them but my wife sent word that men, especially
ex-military men who had either participated or were suspected of participating
in the failed uprising of 7-10 September were being arrested. With a few
bottles of which she managed to get the truck packed and bribed her way through
roadblocks making it to South Africa”.
A young
man by the name of Celestino Bicente from Matola, a mere 8kms from LM gave the
following eyewitness account on 11 September to a South African newspaper.
“Blacks were stopping all cars and searching
them, the army watched without interference. A group of Blacks stopped a car
driven by an 18 year old girl. She refused to let them search her and pleaded
to be allowed to go back to her office. She was pulled from the car and ripped
by machine gun bullets. He said they searched everybody they stopped. When they
found firearms they overturned the cars and set fire to them”
Celestino
arrived at the border post with his family and all the furniture and personal
possessions they could salvage on the back of a small truck.
A 16 year
old called Carlos Carvalho also from Matola told reporters that he had last
seen his parents on Tuesday afternoon (10 September) after he fled from their
burning house. “Black men and women armed
with knives and sticks rushed into Matola and set shacks and houses alight”. Carlos
and his parents were in the back garden when a group of Blacks charged the
house and set fire to it. Carlos in the melee was separated from his parents
when they fled and he managed to get a lift to the border post by a passing
motorist.
While
people leaving Mozambique soon after the September uprising and later after the
October massacres were harassed and harshly treated they had a far easier
passage to South Arica than those from Angola. (See “Escaping Hell” Blog - 14
September 2013). For many Mozambicans the road to “salvation” was a mere 100kms
away and many Mozambicans had done business of some sort in SA or
had come into contact with South Africans who flocked to LM to taste or get a
taste of the Riviera in Africa and its many pleasures. A fact not generally
known is that numerous South Africans who had been in LM at the time of the
attempted coup had in fact assisted in the defence of the Radio Club as well as
other key points in LM.
 |
| Refugee camp set up in Nelspruit |
 |
| Locals and Portuguese refugees in Nelpruit making food |
In
Pretoria a large refugee camp was set up under the auspices of the Pretoria
Branch of the Mozambique relief organization, it was set up to act as a
“clearing house for Portuguese citizens who had fled Mozambique and who were
considering to make South Africa their home.
The camp
was the biggest in SA to house refugees and those who would be housed at
Cullinan would be those people with work permits after being documented by the
South Africans in other refugee camps set up around the country. Appeals were
made via the radio as well as newspapers for clothing and food to assist the
refugees as well as for all organizations to work together in assisting those
in need.
Headlines
and extracts from the Nelspruit based Lowvelder newspaper as well as other
newspapers from that period give some indication as to how the Portuguese tried
to assimilate themselves in to their new surroundings and make the best of
their situation as well as tell South African readers was happening across the
border in the “New Mozambique”. One also has to remember that while John
Vorster and the South African government were walking the road of détente and
had decided that black run governments on the doorstep were acceptable. The
average white South African was worried even scared as to what the future held
with “Die swaart gevaar” (The black
danger) rampaging on their very doorstep.
While many
Portuguese refugees from Mozambique and Angola decided to make South Africa
home, those that came to South Africa and did not want to stay or were classed
as mixed race would have opted to go back to Portugal, Brazil, Argentina and
Venezuela. Many refugees did not want to go back to Portugal as they felt the
Portuguese government had betrayed them, Portugal’s economy would also battle
to sustain new arrivals.
Many
refugees thought of themselves at African and not European those that chose
South Africa were absorbed into the Portuguese community that by 1977 had grown
immensely. Portuguese communities also sprang up in South West Africa while
others chose Rhodesia as their new home.
The
Portuguese who moved into South Africa and Rhodesia from Mozambique had certain
skills – in building, engineering and running cafes, they were also tough as
well as street smart. Their arrival in Rhodesia in particular made the white
immigration figures looked much healthier with their arrival. While a good number
decided to stay on and even give their lives for Rhodesia, many just used
Rhodesia as a springboard to other destinations and had no intention of leaving
their bones in Rhodesian soil.
An
interesting piece of information I came across was that in 1975/76 the Department
for Retornado’s (Returnees) in Lisbon was under the control of Retornado’s from
Nampula, Mozambique who had arrived in Lisbon before many other Mozambicans and
especially Angolans. They managed to get some of the better jobs, with many to
this day still going strong in all spheres of Portuguese life especially the
government.
It would
seem that Retornado’s from Mozambique had it much easier than Angolans who had
seen difficult times getting out of Angola as well as South Africa; it was not
to get better for them in Portugal. Those Angolans who managed to get to Brazil
did manage to do well for themselves with many today being part of the upper
class of that country. Some Angolans did manage to assimilate into mainland Portugal;
in fact the present Portuguese Prime Minister Dr. Passos Coelho is the son of a
Retornado from Angola.
.jpg)
It’s ironic that close to 40 years after independence and having been
subject to Socialism as well as Marxism, Portugal’s former colonies have
produced nothing but misery for its people/s. If you take Angola in particular
with its abundant resource’s of oil,
diamonds, fertile soil and once huge herds of game. Even investments from
overseas as well as intervention by experts in their field have not been able
to undo the years of mismanagement that have caused untold misery for the man
on the street in former Portuguese colonies.
All the diamonds and oil in Angola have only enriched the “fat cats”
while the rest have to be satisfied with the scraps from the table. In Portugal
itself, those same Communists that took pleasure in throwing Angola, Guinea and
Mozambique to the wolves are now screaming and shouting because Portugal is
seen as the poor-house of Europe, much like it was in the early 1900’s. If Portugal had of stood strong and kept Angola
and Mozambique within the fold there is no doubt that Portugal, Angola and
Mozambique would have seen great development in their industrial as well as
agricultural sectors that would have seen powerhouses of their respective
continents.
With
regards Mozambique’s relationship with South Africa it was imperative that both
countries would tread a cautious path until an official policy could be worked
out. Frelimo were aware that the return of capital that was provided by 100 000
Mozambicans working in South Africa’s mines was sorely needed as was the
revenue earned from the passage of South African and Rhodesian cargo through
the ports of Beira and LM. Another little known fact is that because of all the
money that was taken out of Mozambique by those leaving by May 1974 Mozambique
had no foreign reserves and when the transitional government headed by Joaquim
Chissano took power South Africa gave it R42 000 000 as a gesture of
goodwill and also as part of Vorsters Détente policy.
I like to
understand why certain events happen and I was perplexed as to why South Africa
would have given Mozambique that amount of money, so I did some digging and
this is what I came up with.
From 1929
South Africa had an agreement (revised in 1963) with Mozambique regards the use
of Mozambicans on the mines in the Highveld. The agreement saw the miners
getting paid half of their salary in South Africa with the balance being paid
to the miners in Escudos when they returned home at the end of their contract.
This meant that the miners would have money for their families and that much
needed revenue was pumped into the Mozambican and not the South Africa economy.
The money
was paid out in gold and in the latter years it was flown by military plane to Lisbon;
here Lisbon would then transfer monies over to the miners in Mozambican
currency. Every so often the Portuguese asked the South African chamber of
mines to sell part of the gold on the open market and pay Portugal in $’s as
part of the payment.
This
arrangement worked well for Mozambique as in 1963 a price of $42.00 per ounce
had been agreed upon this meant that anything over $42.00 the extra monies
would be utilized by the Mozambican government to assist with domestic issues. The
last time this happened was in 1973 when the price of Gold was $69.20, giving
Mozambique a profit of $27.20 that generated many thousands of Dollars for the
local government.
The
attitude of the South African Government after September 1974 was “Ok they have
agreed in Lusaka and they have a transitional government with Frelimo having
the majority of posts in that government. South Africa decided that this
government was then the de-facto government of Mozambique and therefore the
monies from the gold miners was in fact theirs.
The
handing over of the R42 000 000 was therefore not a loan or a
hand-out it was monies due to the Mozambican government as per the 1929/1963
agreement between RSA and Mozambique from 1929, the fact that Frelimo were now
in charge did not change South Africa’s thinking and in fact was a clever move
by John Vorster and the South African Government as South Africa lost nothing
but gained “brownie” points by “helping” Mozambique at the start of its new
journey. The fact that South Africa paid the monies over also as I mentioned
earlier gave recognition to Frelimo and the transitional government without
having to go the “formal” route.
This was
all part of John Vorsters détente policy
that sought regional stability and if he was to achieve this then he felt that
he could be mentioned in the same circles as 3 South African statesmen admired locally and abroad; Jan Smuts, Louis
Botha and J B M Hertzog.
.jpg)
Vorster while seen by many
as a racist bully was in fact a complex man who was more than capable of being
both charming as well as intimidating. By the mid-70's he was the most popular
leader amongst Afrikaners since Louis Botha. During the 70's he assumed almost
complete control of the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement and while he could have
used this control as well as his popularity to push South Africa on the road to
reconciliation between whites and blacks he was convinced that separate
development was the only way forward for his country and his people. Yet he
also understood that the Afrikaners and their policy of apartheid would not survive
in the long run so he looked to change this by trying to attract English
speaking South Africans’ support by abolishing the most blatant forms of racial
discrimination and launched his détente policy towards Africa and by doing so
attempted to influence the West so that they would lessen the pressure that
they had been applying on South Africa over its racial policies.
His hand of friendship to
Africa is what aroused the most interest amongst friend and foe alike and
according to Vorster himself gave him the “most satisfaction” of his political
career. Certain political events at the time also allowed Vorster to show the
West as well as Africa that he was in fact serious about stability in Africa
and Southern Africa especially. The first was the collapse of the Portuguese
empire in late 1974, if played correctly then by not supporting the white
Portuguese political factions that wanted to use a coup to divide Mozambique
into a divided country he could show that South Africa was willing to become a
regional superpower and assist with development aid and by doing so hopefully
be accepted by African leaders as a statesman and South Africa as a stabilizing
force in the region. To achieve this Vorster was prepared to take significant
risks.
Vorster set about wooing
conservative African leaders by setting 3 goals
1.
To bring about an acceptable settlement in
Rhodesia
2.
To bring about an acceptable settlement in
South West Africa (Namibia)
3.
Make modifications to Apartheid that would be
acceptable to his power base (the Afrikaners), the West and Africa.
He said at the end of
1974……………. “Give us 6 months and see where South Africa stands”. Rhodesia was
probably Vorster’s biggest test. And in an attempt to bring about a negotiated
settlement, in 1975 he withdrew South African military assistance from that
country as well as slowed down economic activity. This he expected to achieve
the following.
1. Force
Ian Smith into a position where he would have to sit down with nationalist
movements looking to wrest power from him.
2. Convince
a very skeptical Africa that South Africa could in fact be an honest broker.
A ceasefire was forced upon
Rhodesia by Vorster and while Rhodesian's abided by the ceasefire the Nationalist movements used it as a re-training, re-supplying and re-equipping
exercise, what this did in fact was to give ZANLA and ZIPRA time to regroup.
Prior to the ceasefire the terrorists were in big trouble, they numbered less
than 100 within the borders of Rhodesia itself, where ill-equipped and had no
visible leadership; the Rhodesian's were on the verge of winning when the
ceasefire threw a spanner in the works. Add to this Frelimo being handed power
in Mozambique the frontier that had to be protected was expanded by 100 kilometres
and by early 1976 there were an estimated 2000 terrorists in Operation
Thrasher’s area alone.
Vorster’s attempts at détente
in Africa did not work out as planned and by August 1975 it began to falter
with Ian Smith and the nationalist leaders not being able to come to any
alternative that would see their supporters satisfied. The nail in the coffin
for Vorster’s détente came when South Africa invaded Angola (after requests
from the USA and a number of friendlier African countries) in late 1975. Many
people to this day are still baffled that a man wanting to be seen as the
“champion” of a stable region would use his army to destabilize a neighbouring
country without any concrete guarantees of support from America or his own
constituents.
It’s believed that he was
persuaded by the hawks in the military when his closest adviser General van den
Bergh was on an overseas trip, this decision as we know had far reaching
consequences for not only South Africa but also for Russia, Cuba and Southern
Africa in general.
Military action as well as
ill-advised political considerations would see South Africa locked in battle
against The MPLA, the Soviets and the Cubans for many years to come. This in
turn would lead to the suffering of the Angolan Population (Escapando ao Inferno/Escaping Hell Blog of 14
September 2013) as well as the loss of many young South Africans who gave
their lives in the fight against Communism. Many believe that their sacrifice
was in vain but I believe it gave South Africa a chance to be able to negotiate
from a position of strength and contributed to the downfall of Communism…………………….
Sources:
·
Wikipedia
·
Vorsters Africa (Friendship and frustration)
– Al J Venter
·
A number of contributor who asked to remain
anonymous (thank you very much)
·
My own research notes
·
My Professor in Lisbon
·
Portuguese speaking soldiers in the SADF
Facebook page
·
Portuguese speaking soldiers in Rhodesia Facebook page
·
Southern Africa and South Africa military
history books Facebook page
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