Daniel and the LM uprising

Daniel Roxo

Part 3

The LM uprising: 7 – 10 September 1974

1974 was a watershed year for Portugal, its colonies on the African continent as well as the peoples that lived there both black and white. The Lisbon coup of 1 April changed the history of Southern Africa and with it the destinies of so many men, women and children. Daniel and his family were not exempt. 

LM citizens in the impromptu uprising that led to the "coup" of 7-10 September 1974

There has been much debate as to what Daniels involvement with the impulsive uprising in LM between 7 and 10 September. Many people believe that Daniel had been intricately involved in its planning while others believe he was merely in the right place at the wrong time and  was inadvertently sucked in over those 96 hours of futile resistance. I believe that this purported coup was in fact nothing more than a civil disobedience that was hijacked by certain organizations with covert agenda’s.

Daniel was not a politically driven man, he was a patriot and I believe that Daniel wanted to stay in Mozambique and I am sure that he like many others hoped that there was a strong possibility of waging a war that would disrupt and incapacitate Frelimo so that a moderate government representing all the peoples of Mozambique could  take over the reins of power. I believe that even at this stage Daniel believed that he could still play a role and contribute to the defence of Mozambique and felt that the country under the leadership of a Communist backed Frelimo government would only lead to hardship for its citizens . “black and white”.

What is certain is that Daniel to some of the leaders of this botched coup attempt would have been a very useful tool and it has been suggested but as yet not proven that Daniel was used as a liaison between the coup leaders and South African military due to his contacts in LM.

Daniel with his brother Alipio met with a senior South African military contact sometime during the day on 7 September to discuss the possibility of him moving to SA and joining the SADF. Daniel was told that he would have to make his own way to the border, that there were no guarantees he would be given work with the SADF and that he would still need to pass a fitness test as well as aptitude tests to ensure his suitability.  

Rare photo of Daniel and his involvement in the L.M coup

Later that day Daniel was to make his appearance at the Radio Club and started to assist with security arrangements around the Radio station itself as well as co-ordinate the volunteers and decide what other strategic buildings in the city would need to be taken over so as to give the uprising more of a chance of success.

From an eye witness account Daniel appeared at the doorway of the Radio Club boardroom late on 7 September, Daniel did not attempt to take command or interfere with what was happening an indication to me That he was not involved in the planning or in a leadership role and that in fact he had come to assist in whatever way he could, His presence was for many both inside as well as outside the building was tremendous morale booster. By now South African news papers were getting wind of the protest in LM and headlines such as “Mozambique tense”, “Frelimo mobs stone army and police”, “White dissidents end Frelimo protests” started to appear in local South African newspapers.

At some stage during all the confusion Daniel and a former captain of the 6^th Commando Company called for all able bodied men and especially ex – Commandos who were willing to fight to assemble at 7pm in the Alves Cabral park situated near the famous Polana hotel and to bring with them whatever firearms they could lay their hands on.

Alves Cabral park

While numerous men did arrive at the park it was not in their thousands as has been indicated in the past. Numbers of between 400 – 1000 ex military men many being ex - Mozambican Commando’s from Montepuez seem to be more realistic but the truth is that no one really knows. A number of civilians including a few South Africans who were on holiday in LM at the time also arrived to see what help they could lend in defending the radio station as well as assisting in securing crucial key points. 

By midnight, some say it was earlier Daniel and armed volunteers had secured the telephone exchange right next door to the Radio Club, which would not have been too difficult due to it only being under the control of 1 civilian policeman. Daniel is reported to have been in charge of securing the Gago Coutinho airport  some 8kms away from the city centre early on the morning of 8 September. This would have been relatively easy for someone of Daniels experience especially as there was no proper defence set up at the airport.

While citizens of LM were protesting, a live broadcast from neighboring Tanzania by Frelimo called for the United Nations to intervene if the Portuguese authorities did not take immediate action to suppress the revolt by its white citizens. Frelimo supporters were also gathering in large numbers at the local football and bullfighting stadiums in opposition against the occupation of the Radio Club as well as other key buildings by the citizens involved in this purported coup.

The Portuguese authorities were trying to end the revolt and used a number of ruses to achieve this goal. For example at approximately 4 am on 8 September a message was sent from the army unit stationed in Boane that they intended to join in the demonstrations, but wanted 20-30 men dressed in Portuguese uniform to meet them at Matola and they would throw in their lot with the people. Daniel’s advice was asked for and he urged them against sending any men as he felt it was a trap.   

Major Belchior the Commander of the Montepuez Commando Battalion was instructed by his superiors to go to LM on Sunday morning 8 September with 2 companies of Commandos and put an immediate end to the coup and to use whatever means necessary  Major Belchior wisely decided to leave the 2 companies behind in Beira, probably because he was not 100% sure of their loyalty or what would happen if he got there and out of loyalty towards old comrades decided to join the uprising, another concern was that the black commando’s could join pro-Frelimo forces as they were uncertain about their future.

Belchior arrived in LM late on the 8th and  wearing civilian clothes, went straight to the Radio Club to see if he could arrange a meeting with the ringleaders to try and put a peaceful end to the uprising. He was apparently recognized by an ex-Commando who was restricting access to the building and some reports have indicated he was in fact chased away by a portion of the crowd who believed that he was there to reconnoiter the building and what weapons those defending it had in their possession. Whether or not he was chased away a meeting was arranged and was scheduled to be held at the general army headquarters on Avenida António Enes starting at 5.30pm and was to last till 3am on the 9^th

The official cease fire between Portugal and Frelimo had come into effect at 1 minute past midnight on 8 September. Frelimo soldiers had started to arrive in LM on Monday 9 September courtesy of the Portuguese Security Forces, these were not the first Frelimo in LM as it would seem from early that year Frelimo political commissars had been very active and laying the groundwork to politicize the “Povo” in LM to ensure support and let them know that Frelimo were gaining ground in the fight against Portugal.

Frelimo/Tanzanian troops arriving in LM to start patrolling with Portuguese troops.

Those initial arrivals immediately started to man roadblocks with regular Portuguese troops. But they were not Frelimo, they were in fact Tanzanian soldiers posing as Frelimo. Another group of Tanzanians posing a Frelimo were to arrive by boat on 10 September. Why use Tanzanian troops? Well with Tanzania being an ally of Frelimo they were the only troops that they could trust until Frelimo cadres being trained in conventional warfare training could be transported to LM to replace the Tanzanians and work with the Portuguese military.         

I believe that those organising the uprising were aware of this and if they weren’t then Belchior informed them and this is the reason that 15 of the ringleaders, black anti-Frelimo leaders as well as a number of ex-military men involved in the coup, attended the meeting. Daniel  as far as I am aware was not present at this meeting and was probably assisting with security issues in and around LM.

Exact details of what was discussed at the 9 hour meeting are not known to me at present,  however if I were to venture an educated guess this is what I would have asked for if I was part of the discussions

·         Immunity against prosecution by the Portuguese authorities

·         Assurances that the security forces would not use force and fire upon unarmed sections of the crowd (especially women and children)

·         Safe passage out of Mozambique to either Portugal, Rhodesia or South Africa

·         Assurances that the Portuguese security forces would not allow any retaliation from pro-Frelimo supporters

With the majority of ex or serving security force members, especially Commando’s out of the way and with Daniel also being isolated it was now up to the remaining leaders to carry on with this pseudo coup. Those in charge must have realized that without the assistance from either South Africa or Rhodesia and with the military element of the coup having been taken out of the equation it would be suicidal to carry on, especially with the fact that over the previous 2 days Frelimo agitators had been whipping up the local black population and that Frelimo troops were being ferried in to the North of the country at a fast pace and would soon be transported to LM to assist the Tanzanian/Portuguese army units in bringing the coup under control.

Without military support it would be impossible for the MFM to protect whites against retaliatory attacks by blacks or Frelimo troops. It was agreed that until the Paratroopers arrived in LM to take over key installations and return the radio station back to its professional staff  the military element of the coup would protect it from any harm as per the agreement with Belchior. The uprising was over the people at the radio station needed to be informed as did those at the radio station who still believed that there bid for UDI would be successful. 

 

Soon after the MFM had been forced to stop the protest a young lady emerged from the radio Club and with tears in her eyes informed the crowd in our around the Radio Club that the uprising had in fact failed they then picked up anything they could lay their hands on, even fruit and threw it at the building, shattering every window, this anger was to be short lived as the  Portuguese army soon stepped in and dispersed them with thunder flashes and gunfire. Those that had been swept along by the brief tide of  freedom and euphoria now had to decide “stay or leave”, I often wonder what thoughts must have gone through people’s minds as they grasped with the realization that Mozambique their home was gone. 

I have also wondered at what stage Daniel realized that the coup attempt was doomed and what his thoughts were at the time, having spent 10 years or more hunting down and killing Frelimo, it must have been difficult for him to realize that it was over and Mozambique as he knew it would never be that same again, Daniel was in the Radio station to the end, this was confirmed to me by a reliable source who saw Daniel standing at the door to the boardroom as the decision was made to abandon the building.

The fact that there was a proper coup arranged for around the dates of 16-20 September should not go unmentioned, this coup plot had taken months of planning and allegedly involved numerous role-players from Angola, Portugal, Mozambique, South Africa and the Rhodesians and has been a open secret within political and military circles for many years. There are those that believe the spontaneous uprising of the 7-10 September was actually used by secret agents to show the plotters hand and give Frelimo an easier ride to taking over Mozambique. “Stabbed in the back” and “Swindle organised by the KGB in Luanda” are phrases I have heard or read. What the man in the street did not realise is that there was much more at stake than just the independence of Mozambique however that is another story……… “No another book that will hopefully be told in the not too distant future”.        

Stephen Dunkley
12 February 2013